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Article 31(b), Tempia-Miranda, and the
Military Defendant
ABSTRACT

When military servicemembers in North Carolinawho are suspected
of a crime make inculpatory statements to their military superiors, and are
tried in a military tribunal, they are both statutorily and constitutionally
protected against the dangers of involuntary self-incrimination resulting
from the military's inherently coercive atmosphere. When those same
servicemembers make incriminating statements to military superiors who
are not commissioned officers and are later tried in a North Carolina
Criminal Court, they are left vulnerable by North Carolina's rule that
assigns law enforcement equivalency only to commissioned officers with
the authority to order servicemembers into arrest or confinement under
military regulations.
This Comment, which concludes with a recommendation that North
Carolina adopt a rule fashioned after the more effective rule applied by
military courts, begins with an overview of the historical evolution of
servicemembers' rights against self-incriminationfrom the early years of
the republic to the United States Court of Military Appeals's ruling in
United States v. Tempia extending Miranda's protections to
servicemembers. This Comment next considers North Carolina'srule in
State v. Davis-discussing the majority's reasoning and highlighting
deficiencies. Finally, this Comment proposes a new rule that would ensure
servicemembers are adequatelyprotected.

IN TRO DU CTION ..........................................................................................

206

I. ARTICLE 31, MIRANDA, AND TEMPIA: THE END TO DRUMHEAD
JU ST IC E ...........................................................................................

2 10

A . A rticle 3 1 .................................................................................
B . M irandav. A rizona..................................................................
C. UnitedStates v. Tempia: The Extension of Mirandato the
M ilitary ....................................................................................
II. STATE V. DAVIS: SERVICEMEMBERS' RIGHTS AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION IN NORTH CAROLINA ............................................

2 13
216
2 19

222

A. The Facts Underlying the Court's Ruling in Davis ................. 222
B. The D avis Court's Analysis .....................................................
223

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2018

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

III. THE PROBLEMS WITH NORTH CAROLINA'S APPLICATION OF THE
RULE EXTENDING MIRANDA TO SERVICEMEMBERS AND THE
WAY FORWA RD ..............................................................................

A. The Majority Approach: Complicated, Narrow, and Shortsig hted ......................................................................................
1. Davis Unnecessarily Requires Jurists to Understand
Com plex M ilitary Concepts ...............................................
2. The Davis Rule is Unduly Narrow and May Fail to
Provide Adequate Protection .............................................
3. The Court's Substantial Reliance on Brown's Authority
Ignores the Many Scenarios in Which a Military
Superior Might Question his Subordinates for Other
Than Disciplinary Reasons ................................................
B. The Concurring Approach: A Guidepost to a Better Rule ......
C ON CLU SION ..............................................................................................

227
227
228
229

231
232
235

INTRODUCTION

On August 18, 2011, Army Specialist Christopher Blackett and his
roommate, Army Private First Class Sebastian Gamez, were arrested on
charges of first-degree murder and disposing of a corpse.' The soldiers'
arrests followed statements they made to Blackett's Section Sergeant,
Lavern Sellers, and later to their Company First Sergeant, Rebecca
Schlegelmilch, regarding the shooting death of their seventeen-year-old
next-door neighbor, Vincent Carlisle.2 Blackett's spontaneous confession
to Sellers precipitated the search for the teenager, 3 whose body was found

1. Arrest Report, State v. Blackett, Nos. 11CRS53885, 11CRS53880, 13CRS425
(N.C. Super. Ct., Harnett Cry. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review) [hereinafter
Blackett Arrest Report]; Arrest Report, State v. Gamez, Nos. 11CRS53886, 11CRS05388,
13CRS000424 (N.C. Super. Ct., Harnett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review)
[hereinafter Gamez Arrest Report]. Blackett and Gamez were arrested at Fort Bragg, N.C.
and transported to Harnett County, where they were then charged. Blackett Arrest Report,
supra; Gamez Arrest Report, supra. While bond for both was set at $100,000.00 on the
disposing of a corpse charge, both were held without bond on the murder charges. Blackett
Arrest Report, supra; Gamez Arrest Report, supra.
2. See Interview by Rodney S. Jackson with Rebecca Schlegelmilch, Company First
Sergeant, U.S. Army (Aug. 18, 2011) (transcript on file with Campbell Law Review)
[hereinafter Schlegelmilch Interview].
3. Id. Blackett's initial confession was to Sellers, who had been assigned to transport
Blackett to base legal services on another matter. See Interview by Donald E. Harrop with
Lavern Sellers, Section Sergeant, U.S. Army (Oct. 6, 2011).
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in a wooded field just inside the Harnett County line.4 Following their
initial statements to Sellers and Schlegelmilch, Blackett and Gamez also
made statements about the shooting to deputies with the Harnett County
Sheriffs Department and later the Cumberland County Sheriffs
Department.
After law enforcement discovered Carlisle's body, the
Harnett County District Attorney secured grand jury indictments against
both Blackett and Gamez.
Largely relying on the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in
State v. Davis, Blackett and Gamez filed motions to suppress certain
unwarned, incriminating statements, including those made to Sergeant
Sellers and First Sergeant Schlegelmilch, asserting that the statements were
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.8 In Davis, the North Carolina
4. See Application for Search Warrant at Attachment #2, State v. Gamez, Nos.
11CRS53886, 11CRS05388, 13CRS000424 (N.C. Super. Ct., Harnett Cty. 2016) (on file
with Campbell Law Review).
5. Blackett and Gamez lived as roommates in Cumberland County, N.C., but the
victim's body was located just across the county line in Hamett County. Id. Law
enforcement officials from both counties were originally involved in the investigation
because it was initially unclear whether the shooting had occurred in Cumberland or Harnett
County. See Prosecution Report, State v. Gamez, Nos. 11CRS53886, 11CRS05388,
13CRS000424 (N.C. Super. Ct., Hamett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review).
6. Blackett and Gamez were indicted on charges of murder, concealing the death of a
person, first-degree kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping.
Indictment, State v. Blackett, No. 11 CRS53885 (N.C. Super. Ct., Harnett Cty. 2016) (on file
with Campbell Law Review) (indicting Blackett for murder); Indictment, State v. Blackett,
No. 11CRS53880 (N.C. Super. Ct., Harnett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review)
(indicting Blackett for concealing the death of a person); Indictment, State v. Blackett, No.
13CRS00425 (N.C. Super. Ct., Hamett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review)
(indicting Blackett for first-degree kidnapping); Indictment, State v. Blackett, No.
16CRS00652 (N.C. Super. Ct., Hamett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review)
(indicting Blackett for conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping); Indictment, State v.
Gamez, No. 11CRS53886 (N.C. Super. Ct., Hamett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law
Review) (indicting Gamez for murder); Indictment, State v. Gamez, No. 13CRS00424 (N.C.
Super. Ct., Harnett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review) (indicting Gamez for
first-degree kidnapping); Indictment, State v. Gamez, No. 11CRS53881 (N.C. Super. Ct.,
Harnett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review) (indicting Gamez for concealing
the death of a person); Indictment, State v. Gamez, No. 16CRS00651 (N.C. Super. Ct.,
Harnett Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review) (indicting Gamez for conspiracy to
commit first-degree kidnapping).
7. State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Amended Motion to Suppress Statements
Made by Defendant to His Military Superiors and Subsequently Made to Law Enforcement,
State v. Blackett, Nos. 11CRS53885, 11 CRS53880, 13CRS425 (N.C. Super. Ct., Harnett
Cty. 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review) [hereinafter Blackett's Motion to
Suppress]; Motion to Suppress Statements Made by Defendant, State v. Gamez, Nos.
11 CRS53886, 11 CRS05388, 13CRS000424 (N.C. Super. Ct., Hamett Cty. 2016).
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Court of Appeals held that the defendant, a marine corps private, was
subjected to custodial interrogation under Miranda when he made
incriminating statements to his Platoon Commander, Marine Corps Chief
Warrant Officer (CW3) Kenneth Lee Brown. 9
In reaching this
determination, the Davis Court stated that, "[T]he trial court was required
to determine whether defendant's statements were the result of 'questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after [defendant had] been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. ' ' 1 Based upon its understanding of Brown's authority under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the court concluded that CW3
Brown was a law enforcement official within the meaning of Miranda."
According to the court-and contrary to Brown's testimony-Brown was a
commissioned officer who possessed the authority under military
12
regulations to order those under his command into arrest or confinement.
The court reasoned that13 such authority was "sufficient to invoke the
protections of Miranda.'
The rule in Davis, if strictly construed, limits Davis's applicability to
cases where a commissioned officer with the authority to arrest or confine
conducts questioning. Blackett's and Gamez's reliance on Davis was
problematic because neither Sergeant Sellers nor First Sergeant
Schlegelmilch were commissioned officers possessing the authority to
order an inferior into arrest or confinement.' 4 The distinction between the
facts of Blackett's and Gamez's cases and the facts in Davis serves as the
impetus for this Comment.
When servicemembers commit crimes, their first statements are often
to their military superiors. This reality raises the questions of whether and
under what circumstances unwamed, incriminating statements made by
servicemembers to military superiors are the product of custodial
interrogation under Miranda and United States v. Tempia 5 and, thus, must
be excluded from a criminal trial. Blacken's and Gamez's cases are
illustrative of the circumstances under which a servicemember's
incriminating statements made to military superiors might be used against
that servicemember in a criminal case prosecuted by civilian authorities.

9. Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 289.
10. Id. at 295 (quoting State v. Gaines, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (N.C. 1997)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 295 n.l.
13. Id. at 295.
14. Schlegelmilch Interview, supranote 2.
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966); United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A.
629 (1967). This Comment will collectively refer to these two seminal cases as MirandaTempia.
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Furthermore, they demonstrate how a general lack of understanding
regarding military rank and corresponding authority, as provided under the
UCMJ, might result in the erroneous reliance of a military defendant on
Davis's authority when challenging the admissibility of incriminating
statements made to a military superior.
Blackett forewent a hearing on his motion and entered into a plea
agreement with the Harnett County District Attorney on August 23, 2016.16
An order denying Gamez's motion was entered on January 4, 2017.17
Whereas Davis demonstrates a lack of understanding by the court regarding
military rank, authority, and culture, Blackett's and Gamez's motions to
suppress demonstrate an equal lack of understanding on the part of their
defense about how Davis operates. 18 This, in turn, raises the question of
whether the reasoning applied in Davis establishes a reliable rule for future
defendants who will look to that decision in support of their motions to
suppress statements made to their military superiors.
Would the
application of military law under Article 31 provide civilian courts with a
more easily ascertainable and inherently fairer standard upon which to base
their determination of whether a servicemember's rights were violated?
Military servicemembers assigned to duty stations within North
Carolina, like Blackett and Gamez, exist within two separate environs. The
first is the United States Armed Forces, which have distinct rules for
conduct and behavior and whose regulations provide protections against
self-incrimination under Article 31 of the UCMJ 19 and Tempia.20 The
second is civilian society, in which the United States Constitution provides
protections against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment as
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda.21 The

16. Paul Woolverton, Former Fort Bragg Solder To Be Locked Up at Least 29 112
Years for Teen's Death, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Aug. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZRW5WFQX.
Blackett pleaded guilty "to second-degree murder, conspiracy and

kidnapping ..

" Id. On October 23, 2016, Christopher Blackett committed suicide in his

cell at Lanesboro Correctional Institution. Ames Alexander, NC Prisons Hit With the
Year's
Sixth
Inmate
Suicide,
CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://perma.cc/C8EM-2RA3.

17. Order Denying Motion, State v. Gamez, Nos. 11CRS53886; 11CRS05388;
13CRS000424 (N.C. Super. Ct., 2016) (Harnett Cty.). Following the denial of his motion,
Gamez also entered into a plea agreement with the state, though the details of the plea are
unknown. The ADA handling the cases expects Gamez to appeal the ruling on his motion.
Email from Donald E. Harrop, Harnett Cty. Assistant Dist. Att'y, to author (Feb. 22, 2017)
(on file with author).
18. Blackett's Motion to Suppress, supranote 8.
19. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012).
20. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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overarching issue that this Comment addresses occurs at the intersection of
these two environs.
Writing for the Davis Court, Judge Geer stressed the importance of
considering "the realities and necessities of military life" when determining
whether a servicemember has been subjected to custodial interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda.22 Ironically, the court ultimately adopted a
rule that applies Miranda's protections only when a servicemember has
made statements to a superior who is also a commissioned officer. This
oversight leaves servicemembers such as Blackett and Gamez, who make
statements to superior non-commissioned officers, unprotected against the
inherently coercive atmosphere that pervades the military environment.
This Comment seeks to determine whether Davis represents the best
means of protecting servicemembers against involuntary self-incrimination
while leaving both the military's interests in maintaining order and
discipline and the government's interests in prosecuting criminal offenders
intact. If it does not, then what is the most effective means to preserve all
interests simultaneously? To that end, Part I provides an overview of the
historical evolution of the rights afforded to servicemembers as related to
the right against unwarned self-incrimination. Next, Part II presents the
North Carolina Court of Appeals's application of Miranda protections in
Davis. Finally, Part III evaluates the Davis Court's application of the rule
extending Miranda to servicemembers and presents an alternative
approach. This Comment concludes with a recommendation that North
Carolina courts look to the rules and teachings of their military counterparts
to determine whether a soldier's rights have been violated, thus avoiding a
misapplication of the law due to a lack of understanding of military society
and culture.
I. ARTICLE 31, MIRANDA, AND TEMPIA: THE END TO DRUMHEAD JUSTICE

Today, military servicemembers enjoy the same constitutional
protections in criminal prosecutions as civilians. However, this was not
always the case. Prior to the adoption of the UCMJ, the Articles of War
and the Articles for the Government of the Navy "constituted the code of
criminal law and criminal procedure for the Armed Forces., 23 From April
10, 1806 until the mid-twentieth century, the military system of justice in
the United States Army was governed by the 101 Articles of War enacted

22. State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
23. Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 28
MIL.

L. REv. 17, 17 (1965).
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by the 1st Congress.2 4 The system, which endured virtually unchanged in
the United States for nearly a century and a half, 5 was based upon earlier
British and Roman systems that were designed to promote obedience,
discipline, and morale within the ranks.2 6 Likewise, the Articles for the
Government of the Navy (Naval Articles) were predicated upon the British
Naval Articles of 1749.2

As they worked toward developing the system of laws that would
eventually govern the nation, the founding fathers were mindful of the
vastly differing objectives of military and civilian societies with respect to
criminal law.2 8 Where criminal law in civilian societies "secure[d] to every
human being in a community all the liberty, security, and happiness
possible, consistent with the safety of all[,],, 29 military criminal law was
imbued with the higher purpose of maintaining morale and discipline
within the fighting forces.30 As highlighted in a 1948 report printed for the
use of the United States Senate Armed Services Committee:
The difference between a military and a civilian organization was
recognized in the fifth amendment of the Constitution, which specifically
excepts from its guaranty of indictment by a grand jury "cases arising in the
land and naval forces." By judicial interpretation the same exception has
been held applicable to the guaranty of jury trial recognized in the sixth
amendment.

This exception was considered so obvious by the founding

fathers that it did not call forth a single word of discussion as it passed
31
through the first session of the First Congress.

Between 1912 and 1920, Congress undertook to revise the 1806
Articles of War, most notably adding Article of War 25, which was a

24. Articles of War (1912-1920), LIfR.

CONGRESS,

https://perma.cc/Q62N-5MHD.

25. See Morgan, supranote 23, at 18.

26. See

STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 80TH CONG., COURTS MARTIAL

LEGISLATION: A STUDY OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE ARTICLES OF WAR

(H.R. 2575); AND TO AMEND THE ARTICLES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NAVY (H.R. 3687;
S.1338) 2-5 (Comm. Print 1948) [hereinafter COURTS MARTIAL LEGISLATION] (surveying
the historical basis for the military system of discipline).
27. Morgan, supra note 23, at 18.
28. COURTS MARTIAL LEGISLATION, supranote 26, at 2.
29. Id.at 3.
30. See id.
at 5 (recounting General Eisenhower's appearance before the House Armed
Services Committee on July 15, 1947, in which the General described the need for harsher
punishments for soldiers than for civilians based upon the primary purpose of military
justice).
31. Id.at 3 (emphasis added).
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statutory protection against self-incrimination.3 2 However, no significant
changes were made to the military system of justice until World War I. 33
In 1948, the United States Congress undertook the comprehensive revision
of the Articles of War under the Elston Act,3 4 which added a paragraph to
Article of War 24."
The 1948 amendment added teeth to the 1920
Article's prohibition against self-incrimination by (1) expressly forbidding
the use of coercion in any form, (2) excluding from evidence any statement
obtained through the use of coercion, and (3) requiring that the accused be
advised of his rights before making any statement.36 It read as follows:
The use of coercion or unlawful influence in any manner whatsoever by
any person to obtain any statement, admission or confession from any
accused person or witness, shall be deemed to be conduct to the prejudice
of good order and military discipline, and no such statement, admission, or
confession shall be received in evidence by any court-martial. It shall be
the duty of any person in obtaining any statement from an accused to
advise him that he does not have to make any statement at all regarding the
offense of which he is accused or being investigated, and that any statement
by the accused may be used as evidence against him in a trial by courtmartial.37
Like the Army's Articles of War, the Naval Articles underwent
38
several revisions while remaining largely true to their British progenitors.
Unlike their Army counterparts, however, the Naval Articles never
provided protections equivalent to those codified in the amended Article of
War 24.39 As World War II neared its conclusion, and in response to
"discussions and criticisms of the justice systems of the Army and Navy, '40
both the Navy Department and the Secretary of War appointed independent
committees to evaluate their respective military justice systems. 4' The next
twenty years saw a burgeoning recognition of the need for change in
military justice. Legislative and jurisprudential changes gradually extended
constitutional and statutory protections against self-incrimination to
32. Captain Frederic I. Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 MIL. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1976). The military right against self-incrimination existed in some form by
1862. Id.at 2.
33. See Articles of War (1912-1920), supra note 24; Morgan, supra note 23.

34. Act of June 24, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, ch. 625, tit. 2, 62 Stat. 604, 627-44; see
also The Elston Act (1948), Lm3R. CONGRESS, https://perma.cc/G5SA-H478.

35. Act of June 24, 1948 § 214, 62 Stat. at 631; Lederer, supranote 32, at 5.
36. Lederer, supra note 32, at 5.
37. Id.

38. See Morgan, supranote 23, at 18.
39. Lederer, supra note 32, at 6.
40. COURTS MARTIAL LEGISLATION, supranote 26, at 1.
41. Id.
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servicemembers. 42 By 1966, Article 31 of the UCMJ gave servicemembers
statutory protection against self-incrimination, while the Miranda and
Tempia decisions provided constitutional safeguards.
A. Article 31
In 1947, the United States Armed Forces were unified under the
Department of Defense and the First Secretary of Defense, James
Forrestal.4 3 In 1948, in response to a request by the Senate Armed Services
Committee,44 Forrestal convened a committee headed by Assistant General
Counsel to the Secretary of Defense Felix E. Larkin to draft a uniform code
of military justice that would combine and supersede the Articles of War,
the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of
the Coast Guard.45 The new UCMJ would be "uniformly applicable in all
its parts to the Army, the Navy, the Air Forces, and the Coast Guard in time
of war and peace. ,46 Further, it "would provide full protection of the rights
of persons subject to the code without undue interference with appropriate
47
military discipline and the exercise of appropriate military functions.",
While the UCMJ drafted by the Forrestal committee would be a "complete
repudiation" of the existing system of military justice, it would not be
modeled after "a system designed to be administered
as the criminal law is
48
administered in a civilian criminal court.
A draft of the bill, proposed by the Forrestal committee to "unify,
consolidate, revise, and codify the Articles of War, the Articles for the
Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard and
to enact and establish a Uniform Code of Military Justice," was submitted
to the House of Representatives on February 8, 1949.49 The bill, having
passed both houses of Congress with very few changes from its draft

42. The Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary
noted a "perceptible trend in the Federal courts toward greater judicial protection for the
American Servicemen." STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL III (Comm.
Print 1963); see generally Felix E. Larkin, Professor Edmund M Morgan and the Drafting
of the Uniform Code, 28 MIL. L. REv. 7, 7 (1965).
43. MilitaryJustice FactSheets, U.S. MARINE CoRPS, https://perma.cc/QXD2-76Y3.
44. Larkin, supra note 42.
45. Morgan, supra note 23, at 22.
46. Letter from James Forrestal, Sec'y of Def., to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House
of Representatives (on file at Univ. of Minn.) [hereinafter Forrestal Letter].
47. Morgan, supra note 23, at 22.
48. Id.
49. H.R. 2498, 81st Cong. (1st Sess. 1949).
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form, 0 took effect in 1951. 5 1 Included in the newly enacted UCMJ was
Article 31, entitled "Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited. 5 2 Today,
Article 31 of the UCMJ provides:
(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate
himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to
incriminate him.
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first
informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does
not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is
accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as
evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a
statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement
or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement
53
may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
The purpose of Article 31, which predated the Supreme Court's ruling
in Miranda by some 15 years, was to "avoid impairment of the
constitutional guarantee against compulsory self incrimination. 5 4 This
protection was necessary "[b]ecause of the effect of superior rank or
official position upon one subject to military law ....
In a military
setting, "the mere asking of a question under certain circumstances is the
equivalent of a command. A person subjected to these pressures may
rightly be regarded as deprived of his freedom to answer or to remain
56
silent."
While Article 31(a) implements the "privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination,, 5 7 Article 31(b), which prohibits questioning without
"s

50. Larkin, supranote 42, at 11.
51. See James F. Falco, Comment, United States v. Tempia: The Questionable
Application of Miranda to the Military, 13 VILL. L. REv. 170, 175 (1967).
52. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1956).
53. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012) (emphasis added). The provisions of Article 31 apply to all
who are subject to the Code and not only Commissioned Officers or those having the power
to order another into arrest or confinement under the UCMJ. See id.
54. United States v. Brown, 38 M.J. 696, 698 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Gibson, 3. C.M.A. 746, 752 (1954)).
55. Gibson, 3 C.M.A. at751.
56. Id. at 752.
57. United States v. Evans, 75 M.J. 302, 305 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
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warning, "is a statutory precursor to Miranda warnings." 8 It "provides
members of the armed forces with statutory assurance that the standard
military requirement for a full and complete response to a superior's
inquiry does not apply in a situation when the privilege against selfincrimination may be invoked."5 9 Based upon the statutory language,
Article 31(b) protections arise only when a person subject to the UCMJ is
suspected or accused of an offense and is questioned by someone also
subject to the Code. 60 However, military courts also require Article 31(b)
warnings be given by civilian investigators in two distinct situations: (1)
when civilian and military authorities are cooperating in their individual
active investigations to the extent that the investigations have effectively
merged, 6' and (2) when a civilian investigator acts on behalf of the
military.6 2 The Article 31 protections apply even when a servicemember is
merely suspected of a crime; he must be informed of the crime of which he
is suspected as well as his right against self-incrimination. 63 Furthermore,
Article 31 rights must be communicated to the subject even if he is not in
custody at the time of the questioning.64
In the 1981 case of United States v. Duga, the Court of Military
Appeals prescribed a two-prong test for determining whether Article 31
rights apply in a given situation.65 Under that test, military courts
considered "whether (1) a questioner subject to the Code was acting in an
official capacity in his inquiry or only had a personal motivation; and (2)
whether the person questioned perceived that the inquiry involved more
than a casual conversation., 66 In a 2014 decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces rejected the subjective second prong of
Duga and announced that, "Article 31(b) ... warnings are required when
(1) a person subject to the UCMJ, (2) interrogates or requests any
statement, (3) from an accused or person suspected of an offense, and (4)
the statements regard the offense of which the person questioned is accused
or suspected.",67 Because the protections extended by Article 31 are

58. Id. at 304-05.
59. Id. at 305 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 445
(C.A.A.F. 2000)).
60. See United States v. Baird, 851 F.2d 376, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
61. Id. (citing United States v. Kellam, 2 M.J. 338, 341 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing United States v. Foley, 12 M.J. 826, 831 (N-M. C.M.R. 1981)).
65. United States v. Duga, 10 M.J. 206, 210 (C.M.A. 1981).
66. Id.
67. United States v. Jones, 73 M.J. 357, 361 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (footnote omitted) (citing
U.S. v. Cohen, 63 M.J. 45, 49 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).
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statutory, rather than constitutional, and because its protections occur at a
lower threshold than those afforded under Miranda,68 not every Article
31 (b) violation will be accompanied by a violation under Miranda.6 9
B. Miranda v. Arizona
On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States announced
its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona,

where it proscribed the

prosecution's use of a criminal defendant's statements obtained during a
custodial interrogation unless certain procedural safeguards had been
employed to ensure that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination had not been violated. 7 ' The decision, which changed
the face of criminal prosecution in the United States, was born in part from
the Court's concern with the atmosphere surrounding incommunicado
police interrogation, which the court described as an "inherently
compelling pressure[]" that undermines the privilege against selfincrimination. 7 2 The court further cautioned that no statement obtained
from a defendant can be "truly the product of free choice" without adequate
safeguards against compulsion .7' To that end, Miranda requires that law
enforcement clearly inform persons in custody of their Miranda rights
before interrogating them-"unless other fully effective means are devised
to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it ....

,

Since the Supreme Court's 1966 decision, constitutional jurisprudence
has established that Miranda attaches only when a person is subjected to
custodial interrogation. In other words, two elements must be met before
Miranda is applicable: (1) the defendant must be "in custody," and (2) the

68. United States v. Santiago, 966 F. Supp. 247, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("The military
sets an extremely low threshold triggering Article 31-no custody required, no accusation
required, mere suspicion is sufficient to trigger the requirement of warnings ....
69. See United States v. Evans, 75 M.J. 302, 306 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71. See id. at 444.
72. See id. at 467.
73. See id. at 457.
74. Id. at 444. A suspect subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of his
right to remain silent and that any statement he makes can be used against him in court
should he choose to waive that right. Id. Furthermore, a subject should be informed of his
right to have an attorney present at questioning and that an attorney will be provide for him
if he cannot afford an attorney. Id. at 444-45.
75. State v. Patterson, 552 S.E.2d 246, 253 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Gaines,
483 S.E.2d 396, 404 (N.C. 1997)).
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questioning must meet the legal definition of "interrogation.",7 6 As to
whether a person was in custody, the court must determine "whether a
reasonable person in defendant's position, under the totality of the
circumstances, would have believed that he was under arrest or was
77
restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest."
Interrogation is any practice "that the police should know [is] reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.",7 8 "By custodial
interrogation, [courts] mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of
' 79
his freedom of action in any significant way.
When the Court announced its decision in Miranda, it might not have
contemplated the decision's application to the questioning of
servicemembers in a military setting.80 In introducing the issue before the
Court at the outset of his majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren wrote,
"[W]e deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual
who is subjected to custodial police interrogation .. ."81 This declaration
was a precise statement of purpose. It also cannot be ignored that Warren
was well aware of Article 31 and its parallel application in armed forces
criminal procedure at the time of the opinion. 82 Yet, Warren noted no
deficiencies in that Article.83 In fact, in stressing that "[t]he limits [the
Court has] placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an
undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement, "84 Warren
referenced the successful balance that had been achieved in other
jurisdictions, including military tribunals whose interrogation rules under

76. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).
77. State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting State v.
Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (N.C. 2001)).
78. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
79. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428 (1984) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444).
80. See Falco, supra note 51. "In Miranda, the Supreme Court invited Congress to
enact safeguards for this privilege. Manifestly, the Court was not concerned with existing
legislation, article 31, other than as an exemplar, but was instead imposing restrictions on
civilian law enforcement officials because of the lack of legislative activity in the civilian
area under scrutiny." Id.at 175 (footnote omitted).
81. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
82. See id.at 489. "Similarly, in our country the Uniform Code of Military Justice has
long provided that no suspect may be interrogated without first being warned of his right not
to make a statement and that any statement he makes may be used against him." Id.(citing
10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1964)).
83. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 489.
84. Id.at 481.
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Article 31 required the exclusion of certain unwarned statements. 85 The
Court's pronouncement that the warnings must be given "unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right[s], 86
paired with its reference to the UCMJ as an exemplar of the successful
application of such means, supports the proposition that Miranda likely left
military law untouched.
At first blush, any debate over Miranda's applicability to the armed
forces might seem like a tilt with windmills-after all, Miranda's
protections serve to enhance those afforded servicemembers under the
UCMJ, do they not? The simple answer is "yes" in cases tried in military
tribunals where admissions not excluded under Miranda might still be
excluded under Article 3 1. However, when this question is considered in
the context of cases like Blackett's and Gamez's, where servicemembers
who have made incriminating statements to military superiors are tried in a
civilian tribunal, Miranda's deficiencies are exposed.
As applied by the Davis court, Mirandaprotections are only afforded
to servicemembers whose statements are made to a person who has the
87
authority under the UCMJ to order another into arrest or confinement.
Servicemembers whose statements were made to military superiors who do
not possess the requisite authority under Davis, or who were not in custody
within the meaning of Miranda, are left largely unprotected because the
Davis rule does not contemplate those situations. Rather than relying on
Miranda to protect servicemembers against self-incrimination, a rule based
upon Article 31 would serve as a bulwark against the types of violations
envisioned by Congress in enacting the UCMJ.8 8
Despite the Miranda Court's apparent acceptance of the UCMJ as
sufficiently protecting servicemembers from violations of their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Department of the Air
Force was not taking any chances. Immediately following promulgation of
the Miranda decision, the Department "directed all Air Police agencies to
comply with its mandate until the question could be resolved [by the
United States Court of Military Appeals]." 89 The prescient Air Force, who
notably does not appear to have extended the same mandate to questioning
by military superiors who were not Air Police, did not have to wait long.

85. See id. at 489.
86. Id. at 444.
87. See State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
88. See Falco, supra note 51.

89. United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 631 n.1 (1967) (emphasis added).
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C. United States v. Tempia: The Extension of Mirandato the Military
On June 14, 1966, the day after the Miranda decision was handed
down, 90 the general court-martial of Airman Third Class Michael L.
Tempia-which would culminate in the Court of Military Appeals's
extension of Miranda to the military-was commenced. 9' Tempia was
charged with "taking indecent liberties with females under the age of
sixteen, in violation of Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 134, 10
USC § 934" after making "obscene proposals" to three girls at the base
library.92 The girls left the library and reported Tempia's conduct to their
parents who, in turn, contacted the base police. 93 The girls, one girl's
parent, and the Air Police returned to the base library and found Tempia in
a reading room. 94 Tempia voluntarily accompanied officers to the Air
Police office, where he was informed of his Article 31 rights and that he
had the option to consult with legal counsel. 95 Upon informing officers that
he wanted an attorney, the interview was terminated, and Tempia was
96
immediately released.
Prior to his arrest, Tempia spoke with Air Police on two additional
occasions, each time receiving warnings as required under Article 31 of the
UCMJ. 97 During the second interview, Tempia informed officers that he
had not yet spoken with counsel. 98 The officers sent Tempia to speak with
the Staff Judge Advocate, who advised Tempia of his Article 31 rights and
told Tempia that, while he could secure a civilian lawyer at his own
expense, he would not be provided military counsel unless charges were
brought against him. 99 Upon returning to the Air Police office for the third
interview, Tempia was again informed of his Article 31 rights and his right
to consult legal counsel.' 00 After declining to consult with counsel, Tempia
confessed to the Air Policemen.'0 '
At trial, Tempia sought to have his confession excluded based on
Miranda's command that a person subject to interrogation be informed that

90. Falco, supra note 51, at 172.
91. Id.; see also Tempia, 16 C.M.A. at 631.
92. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. at 631.
93. Id. at 632.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 632.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 632-33.
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he will be provided counsel prior to any interrogation. 10 2 The general
court-martial rejected Tempia's motion" 3 and ultimately sentenced him to
a "bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement
at hard labor for six months, and reduction [in grade].' 0 4 Tempia's
conviction was affirmed by intermediate appellate authorities. 0 5 It was
subsequently certified to the United States Court of Military Appeals on the
following issue: "Was the board of review correct in its determination that
06
the accused's pretrial statement was properly received in evidence?"'1
The Navy Judge Advocate General filed an amicus curiae brief opposing
the application of Miranda to Tempia's case.' 0 7 The Navy "urged that
military law is in nowise affected by constitutional limitations and, in
consequence, that the principles enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona... do
not apply."' 1 8 The prosecution argued on different grounds.
It
"[c]onced[ed] the application of the Constitution" but urged that "the
Supreme Court has no supervisory power over military tribunals."' 0 9 The
Court of Military Appeals rejected the Navy's argument, holding that both
military and civilian jurisprudence demonstrate conclusively that the
Constitution's protections apply with full force to military personnel." 0
The Court likewise dismissed the prosecution's contention, explaining that
the government had misconstrued the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in
Miranda as deriving from that Court's "supervisory authority over the
administration of criminal justice''''
rather than its power as the ultimate
2
arbiter of constitutional law. "1
In its opinion, the Tempia court expressly rejected the notion that
Article 31 alone is sufficient to ensure servicemembers the constitutional

102. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Tempia, 16 C.M.A. at 633; Falco,
supra note 51, at 172.
103. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. at 633. The court's opinion states that Tempia's motion was
overruled at trial but does not provide the basis. Id.
104. Id. at 631.
105. Id.

106. Id. (text changed from all-uppercase font to ordinary font).
107. Id. at 633.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 633-35.
The court noted that constitutional protections applied to
servicemembers except where the Constitution itself "excluded [servicemembers either]
directly or by necessary implication." Id. at 634 (quoting United States v. Culp, 14 C.M.A.
199 (1963)).
111. Id. at 635.
112. Seeid.
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right against self-incrimination." 3 By quoting verbatim the Miranda
Court's summary of the procedures to be followed by law enforcement
during the custodial interrogation of a suspect, 114 the Tempia court made
clear its acceptance of Miranda's full mandate as applicable to military
interrogees. 1 5 Accordingly, servicemembers were not only statutorily
entitled to warnings against self-incrimination under Article 31 of the
UCMJ, but they were also constitutionally entitled to the right to counsel
warnings required under Miranda.116
When servicemembers are interrogated without having received the
requisite Miranda-Tempia warnings, their statements cannot be received
into evidence in a military tribunal." 17 While Tempia was repeatedly
warned of his right to remain silent and that his statements could be used
against him, he was not adequately informed of his right to have counsel, as
required under Miranda."8 In fact, Tempia was told that he would not be
provided counsel, which led the court to rule
that his confession was
120
inadmissible" 9 and to overturn his conviction.
By 1967, Article 31, along with Miranda and Tempia, ensured that
servicemembers being tried on criminal charges in military tribunals were
protected against making unwarned inculpatory statements without the
advice of counsel. 121 These authorities, however, only addressed situations
in which servicemembers were tried by military courts. Therefore, they
offered minimal guidance for servicemembers like Blackett and Gamez,
whose statements were made to military superiors but who were prosecuted
in civilian courts. Thus, civilian criminal courts were left to develop
constitutionally sound protocols to ensure servicemembers' rights against
self-incrimination were protected in such circumstances. The North
22
Carolina Court of Appeals announced its procedure in State v. Davis.1

113. Id. at 637. "Turning to the views of our dissenting brother, we cannot agree that the
procedures heretofore employed in the armed services are the equivalent of the interrogation
rules laid down in Miranda ....
Id. at 639.
114. Id. at 636 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)).
115. Id. at 636-37.

116. Miranda,384 U.S. at 473.
117. See Tempia, 16 C.M.A. at 639.
118. Id. at 636-37. Tempia was not told that counsel would be provided if he was
indigent. Id. at 637.
119. Id. at 638.
120. Id. at 640.
121. See 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012); Miranda,384 U.S. at 437; Tempia, 16 C.M.A. at 639.
122. See generally State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
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STATE V. DAVIS: SERVICEMEMBERS' RIGHTS AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

In State v. Davis, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the test
established by Miranda and its progeny but modified it slightly
to
123
encompass questioning by a military superior in a military setting.
A.

The Facts Underlying the Court's Ruling in Davis

On June 1, 2001, Marine Corps Private Robert Anthony Davis was
convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping for the killing
of Milton Williams.124 Davis, who was stationed at Twentynine Palms in
California, believed that his victim had raped his wife, Latoya Davis
(Latoya). 125 Before going on leave to North Carolina, Davis boasted to a
fellow marine, Anthony Knight, that "he was going to beat the crap out of a
guy for raping his wife.', 126 After arriving in North Carolina, Davis went to
the bakery where Williams worked and left word with Williams's coworker
that he was in town. 127
Eventually, Davis approached Williams in a Pantry convenience store,
128
claimed his car was broken down, and asked Williams for a ride.
Latoya, who was following behind Williams and Davis, pulled beside
Williams's car, at which time Davis asked Williams whether he knew who
she was. 12 9 Williams reached under the seat of his car in response to
Davis's question, and Davis shot Williams, according to Davis's cousin, to
whom Davis confessed. 30
Before returning to California, Davis also
confessed details of the shooting to two people who later testified about
131
those admissions.
On March 24, 1999, two days before an arrest warrant for Davis was
issued, 132 Davis's mother called Davis, who had returned to his duty station
in California, to inform him that North Carolina sheriffs deputies were on
their way to arrest him. 133 Davis then informed his sergeant, Howard

123. See generally id.
124. Id. at 291-92.
125. Id. at 291; Gary D. Robertson, Former Marine's Conviction Upheld, STAR
ONHNE (May 21,2003), https://perma.cc/U2DA-4BV9.
126. Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 291.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 292.

NEWS

129. Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 292.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 300 n.4.
133. Id. at 293.
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Crosby, that he needed to contact an attorney, but he did not tell him
why. 3 4 Crosby took Davis to speak with his Platoon Sergeant, Lieutenant
Scott Cavenaugh, to request permission to leave his duty station.'35 Crosby
and Cavenaugh then escorted Davis to speak with his Platoon Commander,
Chief Warrant Officer Kenneth Lee Brown. 3 6 Cavenaugh gave Brown an
overview of his discussion with Davis, and Brown asked Davis whether he
was involved.' 3 7 Davis's initial response was that he was "sort of'
involved in the murder.' 3 8 Brown then asked Davis, "Well, are you
involved or not involved? Yes or no question."' 39 Davis then confirmed to
Brown that he was involved and further explained that, while he did not
know Williams, he believed Williams had raped his wife. 14 0 Davis
expressed that he did not want14 to
talk about the matter further; he was then
1
call.
phone
a
make
to
allowed
B. The Davis Court's Analysis
For the crimes of first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping,
Davis received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment followed by a
term of seventy-three to ninety-seven months incarceration. 142 When Davis
appealed his conviction, he asserted, among other things, that his Miranda
rights had been violated when the trial court "refused to suppress [his]
statements" to Brown. 143 To determine whether Davis had been subjected
to custodial interrogation by Brown, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
determined whether Davis's statements resulted from "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after [he] had been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.', 1 44 In
concluding that Davis's constitutional rights had been violated and that his
statements to Brown should have been suppressed, the court held that (1)
Davis had been subjected to questioning by a law enforcement officer, and

134. Id. at 292.
135. Id. at 292-93.
136. Id. at 293.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 1, Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289 (No. 02-401).
143. Id. at 16.
144. Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 295 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Gaines, 483 S.E.2d
396, 405 (N.C. 1997)).
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(2) Davis, when being questioned, was in custody within the meaning of
45
Miranda.1
In answering whether Davis had been subjected to questioning by a
law enforcement officer when questioned by his military superior, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals asked whether Chief Warrant Officer
Brown possessed authority that was analogous to that of a civilian law
enforcement official. 146 According to the court, for a defendant's military
superior to be considered a "law enforcement officer" within the meaning
of Miranda, the military superior must be a commissioned officer,
possessing the authority to order the defendant into arrest or confinement
under Article 9 of the UCMJ. 147 Under the UCMJ, "An enlisted member
may be ordered into arrest or confinement by any commissioned officer by
an order, oral or written, delivered in person or through other persons
subject to this chapter."' 148 In Davis, despite Brown's testimony that he did
not possess the requisite authority, the court found that Brown "was both a
commissioned officer and Platoon Commander" with the authority to order
Davis's arrest. 149 Upon those findings, the Court concluded that Brown's
authority was analogous to that of a law enforcement officer and, thus,
"sufficient to invoke the protections of Miranda."'50
As to the second question, whether Davis was in custody at the time of
the challenged statements, the court admonished that such a determination
can be made "only by reviewing the expectations governing Marines."''
To that end, the court asked whether, under the totality of circumstances, a
reasonable Marine in the same position as Davis "would have believed that
his freedom of movement was limited to the same degree as a formal
arrest."'5 2 The majority concluded that, under the facts of the case, "a
reasonable Marine would have believed that he was required to answer the
questions of his commanding officer and that he was not free to leave until
153
he had done so.'

145. Id. at 295-97.
146. See id. at 295.

147. Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 809 (2012).
148. 10 U.S.C. § 809 (emphasis added).
149. Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 295.
150. Id. See also Commonwealth v. McGrath, 495 A.2d 517, 526 (Pa. 1985) (holding
that defendant was questioned by law enforcement officers when the superior officers who
questioned him were commissioned officers with the authority to order his arrest under
Article 9 of the UCMJ).
151. Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 296.
152. Id. at 295.
153. Id. at 296.
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In reaching its holding as to the question of custody, the Davis court
155
v. Tempia, 5 4 United States v. Shafer,
relied on three cases: United States
56
and Commonwealth v. McGrath.1
In Tempia, in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
announced the applicability of Miranda to military criminal proceedings,
that court held the defendant was in custody within the meaning of
Miranda when he (1) had been formally arrested by military law
enforcement on the statements of his victims, (2) was released to seek the
assistance of counsel, and (3) was summoned by the military Office of
Special Investigations specifically for interrogation. 15 In so holding, the
court highlighted the differences between military and civilian culture,
stating: "In the military, unlike civil life, a suspect may be required to
report and submit to questioning quite without regard to warrants or other
legal process. It ignores the realities of that situation to say that one
ordered to appear for interrogation has not been significantly deprived of
his freedom of action.' 158 Because Tempia had been "clearly summoned
for interrogation" and subject to punishment under the UCMJ had he failed
to comply, the court held that Tempia was in custody within the meaning of
159

Miranda.

In Shafer, 160 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio held that soldiers in the Ohio National Guard, who had already
154. United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 639 (1967).
155. United States v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
156. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 495 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1985).
157. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. at 636.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. While the Davis court did not rely upon Shafer in determining whether Brown was
a law enforcement official within the meaning of Miranda, State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289,
299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), it is interesting to note that the Shafer court drew an analogy
between the circumstances under which Article 31 warnings arise and the facts of its case to
determine whether the "law enforcement official" requirement under Miranda had been
met:
"We have determined that if the request for a statement is made in the 'course of
official interrogation' by a law enforcement officer or by a person with
disciplinary authority over the accused, Article 31 is applicable." Thus a request
for a statement in the course of an official investigation by a person with authority
over the accused is sufficient to trigger the need for Article 31 warnings which are
the military cognate of the Miranda warnings. That is precisely the situation
[here]. Thus [the guardsmen] were entitled to be advised of their constitutional
rights prior to making any such statement.
Shafer, 384 F. Supp. at 490 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 21 C.M.A.
223 (1972)). A more recent case, United States v. Santiago, misconstrued the Shafer court's
analogy as actual reliance on the absence of Article 31 warnings in excluding the
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admitted to firing their weapons during a shooting incident at Kent State
University, were in custody for purposes of Miranda when they were (1)
taken to a gymnasium annexed to the campus police and (2) asked to
complete written statements describing their actions during the shooting
indecent.' 6 ' The court reasoned, as did the Tempia court, that "'custody' of
military personnel does not require the same restraints as in civilian life"
and can occur "when there has been some assumption of control over their
movements."' 162 Like the servicemember in Tempia, the Ohio guardsmen
were ordered to report for the purpose of giving a statement that would
later be used against them. 163 Therefore, the Shafer court held that they
were in custody within the meaning of Miranda.164 Similarly, in McGrath,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a lower court's ruling that a
marine was in custody under Miranda when he was "ordered to report for
questioning by his Commanding Officer, had to stand at attention before
several of his superiors, [and] speak only when spoken to ....165
The Tempia, Shafer, and McGrath courts each decided the question of
custody by giving specific regard to the legal authority of the individuals
conducting the interrogation, as well as the other circumstances of the case.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals followed suit in Davis, stressing that
"areasonable Marine [in Davis's position] would have believed that he was
required to answer the questions of his commanding officer and that he was
not free to leave until he had done So. ' ' 166 Giving substantial weight to
Brown's authority as the defendant's commanding officer, the court held
that Davis was in custody within the meaning of Miranda.167 In so holding,
the court considered that Davis had not voluntarily subjected himself to
questioning, that Davis was not at liberty to leave Brown's office without
permission, and that Brown had directly questioned Davis about his

handwritten statements and, thus, rejected the Shafer court's ruling. 966 F. Supp. 2d 247,
259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
161. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. at 487.
162. Id.at 489.
163. Id.at 490.

164. Id.
165. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 495 A.2d 517, 524 (Pa. 1985). The lower court
considered testimony by the defendant that "he believed that if he did not tell the Captain
about the shooting incident he would go to jail for not obeying an order." Id. at 520
(emphasis added). "When it was pointed out that Captain Gaskin's words were not an
order, McGrath replied: 'Well, as a private, anything an officer says to you, it's-I consider
it-I considered an order at the time."' Id.(emphasis added). McGrath also referred to the
fact that he had no social interaction with officers as a basis for his perception. Id.
166. State v.Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
167. See id. at 296-97.
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involvement in the murder.' 6 8 Interestingly, the court appeared to also rely
on its affirmative response to the first prong of the two-prong testwhether Brown was a law enforcement officer within the 69
meaning of
Miranda-tosupport its conclusion that Davis was in custody. 1
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH NORTH CAROLINA'S APPLICATION OF THE RULE
EXTENDING MIRANDA TO SERVICEMEMBERS AND THE WAY FORWARD

A common thread can be identified among Davis, Tempia, Shafer and
McGrath-an implicit mandate to consider the military context in
determining whether a servicemembers' rights against self-incrimination
has been violated.' 0 While some jurists may interpret the purpose of
considering the military context strictly as an added layer of protection for
the soldier, others will construe it as an admonition to seek balance
between protecting the constitutional rights of the servicemember and
respecting the needs of the military. As applied by the Davis majority, the
jurisprudential imperative to consider the military context 171 signifies what
may be the greatest challenge faced by civilian courts in applying
constitutional protections to servicemembers seeking to exclude unwarned
statements made to military superiors. This is because judges must
examine military rank and military culture-in all their complexity- in
order to consider military context.
In her concurring opinion in Davis, Judge Wanda Bryant highlighted
the inadequacy of the majority approach and suggested an alternative
approach-that the court apply the same rules adopted by the military to
determine when a military superior must give Article 31 and/or Miranda
warnings before questioning a subordinate. 17 2 While this Comment
ultimately endorses an approach based on the concurring opinion, the two
will be discussed in greater detail below.
A.

The Majority Approach: Complicated,Narrow, and Short-sighted

Ultimately, the Davis court's application of the traditional Miranda
test is problematic for several reasons. First, the court's reliance on

168. Id. at 295-96.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 293-95; United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 636 (1967); United
States v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 486, 489 (1974) ("Thus it is necessary to translate the terms of
Miranda into a military context so as to effectuate their meaning."); McGrath, 495 A.2d at
523.
171. See Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 293-95.
172. Id. at 299 (Bryant, J., concurring).
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military authority to determine whether a military superior is a law
enforcement officer within the meaning of Miranda unnecessarily requires
jurists to understand the complex structure of military rank and authority.
Second, the Davis rule is unduly narrow: it only encompasses factual
scenarios in which the suspect's superior is also a "commissioned officer,"
leaving servicemembers such as Blackett and Gamez unprotected. Third,
the court's substantial reliance on Brown's authority in determining that
Davis was "in custody" within the meaning of Miranda ignores the many
scenarios in which a military superior might question his subordinates for
other than disciplinary reasons.
1.

Davis UnnecessarilyRequires Jurists to UnderstandComplex
Military Concepts

The Davis court's examination of military authority to determine
whether a military superior is a law enforcement officer requires jurists to
analyze relationships beyond their grasp. This, in turn, could result in the
misconstruction of a military superior's authority and, consequently, the
misapplication of Miranda's exclusionary rule. On its surface, the twoprong Davis rule seems straightforward: (1) a commissioned officer who
(2) possesses the authority to order his subordinate into arrest or
confinement is a law enforcement official within the meaning of
Miranda.173 However, careful consideration of the Davis court's analysis
reveals the deceptively complex nature of the rule.
In Davis, the court disregarded Chief Warrant Officer Brown's
statement that he did not possess the authority to order an individual into
arrest or confinement. 174 The court posited that Brown "was referring to
the ability to perform a physical arrest, a power lodged in the Military
Police, and was not addressing his authority under the Code of Military
Justice to order a person's arrest or confinement.' 17' Referring to Article 9,
the court relied only on that portion addressing the authority of
"commissioned officers,"' 17 6 supporting the idea that the court did not fully
understand military rank and authority. The remainder of Article 9(b),
which the court left unquoted, provides, "A commanding officer 17 7 may
authorize warrant officers ...to order enlisted members of his command

173. Id. at 295.
174. See id. at 295 n.I.
175. Id.
176. See id.; 10 U.S.C. § 807(b) (2012).
177. "The term 'commanding officer' includes only commissioned officers." 10 U.S.C. §

801(3).
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or subject to his authority into arrest or confinement.' 178 In its discussion,
the court neither referred to this provision nor provided any basis for its
finding that Brown possessed Article 9(b) authority. 179
Article 7 of the UCMJ, governing apprehension, is also instructive in
understanding the distinctions between rank and authority in the armed
forces. 80 "Apprehension" is the term used by the armed forces to describe
"the taking of a person into custody."'' Article 7(b) permits apprehension
when persons authorized under the Code develop "reasonable belief that an
offense has been committed and that the person apprehended committed
'182
it."
Article 7(c) enumerates those categories of officers who may
apprehend persons subject to its authority and, like Article 9, notably
distinguishes "commissioned officers" and "warrant officers."' 8 3 This
distinction suggests that where the Code intends to include "warrant
officers" in a specific grant of authority, that category of officer would be
named.
2.

The Davis Rule is Unduly Narrow and May Fail to Provide
Adequate Protection

Whether the court's determination of Brown's authority was
ultimately, if accidentally, correct in the Davis case, the rule in Davis is
limited to cases in which a commissioned officer questions an inferior.
Consequently, Blacken's and Gamez's reliance on the rule in Davis would

178. Id.§ 809(b) (emphasis added). A Warrant Officer is commissioned by the
President of the United States after attaining the rank of CW2. Id.§ 571(b). This, of
course, raises the question of whether the commission conferred upon a Chief Warrant
Officer has the effect of also conferring upon him the same degree and type of authority
possessed by a "Commissioned Officer" within the meaning of the UCMJ, and specifically
whether he has the authority to order a soldier into arrest or confinement. In Davis, a
Marine Platoon Commander, CW3 Brown, testified that he did not have that authority. See
Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 295 n.i. Further, the fact that a WO1 does not receive such a
commission adds another layer of analysis regarding the military context that must be
conducted by the civilian courts. 10 U.S.C. § 571(b). Military regulations consistently
distinguish between "commissioned officers" and "warrant officers," thereby supporting the
conclusion that, while warrant officers may receive a commission, they do not possess the
same authority as commissioned officers under military regulations. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 741742; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 135-100: APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONED
AND WARRANT OFFICERS OF THE ARMY

600-20:

(1994); U.S.

DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY REGULATION

ARMY COMMAND POLICY (2014) [hereinafter ARMY REGULATION

600-20].

179. Davis, 582 S.E.2d at 295.
180. 10 U.S.C. § 807.
181. Id. § 807(a).

182. Id. § 807(b).
183. Id.§ 807(c).
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have brought them no relief because their statements were made to two
non-commissioned officers, Sergeant Sellers and First Sergeant
Schlegelmilch. While a commissioned officer may either deliver an order
of arrest or confinement through a noncommissioned officer (NCO) 18 4 or
authorize an NCO to order an enlisted member of his command into arrest
or confinement, the NCO does not possess independent authority to order
someone under his or her charge into arrest or confinement. 185 An NCO's
authority is merely an extension of that possessed by the authorizing
commissioned officer. 8 6 Furthermore, an NCO may issue only "minor
nonpunitive, corrective actions as found in AR 27-10" and does not
possess the authority to issue non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of
the UCMJ.' 8 7 Moreover, given an NCO's limited authority with regard to
punishments, arrests, and confinements, as compared to that of a

184. Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) are part of the NCO support channel that
complements the chain of command. NCOs are responsible for assisting the chain of
command in accomplishing the following:
(1)Transmitting, instilling, and ensuring the efficacy of the professional Army
ethic.
(2) Planning and conducting the day-to-day unit operations within prescribed
policies and directives.
(3) Training of enlisted Soldiers in their MOS as well as in the basic skills and
attributes of a Soldier.
(4) Supervising unit physical fitness training and ensuring that unit Soldiers
comply with the weight and appearance standards of AR 600-9 and AR 670-1.
(5) Teaching Soldiers the history of the Army, to include military customs,
courtesies, and traditions.
(6) Caring for individual Soldiers and their Families both on and off duty.
(7) Teaching Soldiers the mission of the unit and developing individual training
programs to support the mission.
(8) Accounting for and maintaining individual arms and equipment of enlisted
Soldiers and unit equipment under their control.
(9) Administering and monitoring the Noncommissioned Officer's Development
Program, and other unit training programs.
(10) Achieving and maintaining courage, candor, competence, commitment, and
compassion.
ARMY REGULATION 600-20, supra note 178, at 2-18(a)(1)-(10).
185. See 10 U.S.C. § 809.
186. Id.
187. ARMY REGULATION 600-20, supra note 178, at 2-18(c)(3).
"Nonjudicial
punishment is a disciplinary measure more serious than the administrative corrective
measures.., but less serious than trial by court-martial." JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY
JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. V, lb (2016). Nonjudicial
punishment may include: corrective custody; forfeiture of pay; reduction in grade; extra
duties; restriction to specified limit, etc. Id. at 5(1)(A)-(B).
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commissioned officer, an NCO's authority is not analogous to that of a
civilian law enforcement officer.
Because the rule articulated by the Davis court contemplates only
scenarios in which a defendant has made inculpatory statements to a
commissioned officer, its strictures fall short of providing adequate
protections to all military defendants tried in civilian courts.
3.

The Court's SubstantialReliance on Brown's Authority Ignores
the Many Scenarios in Which a MilitarySuperiorMight Question
his Subordinatesfor Other Than DisciplinaryReasons

As noted above, in making its determination that Davis was in custody
when speaking to Brown, the court relied heavily on Brown's position of
authority over Davis. In fact, in addressing nearly every other factor to be
considered, the court referenced Brown's authority. In her concurring
opinion, Judge Bryant criticized the majority's analysis as being deleterious
to the soldier-commanding officer relationship and ignoring "the reality
that military officers perform many different roles: they are not always
disciplinarians."' 8
While it is reasonable for courts to consider commissioned officers'
and military law enforcement officials' authority to compel a soldier to
follow orders, courts should also recognize that the heightened expectations
of discipline, good order, and obedience within the military do not equate
to arrest. If that were the case, soldiers would find themselves in a
persistent state of custody upon entering military service. Military society
is specialized and separate from that of civilian society and imposes daily
constraints on freedoms that are unknown to civilians. Thus, civilian courts
should be mindful that what they view as tantamount to arrest might be
viewed as a natural constraint of military service by a marine. In Davis, for
example, the Marine defendant was required to ask permission of his
Platoon Sergeant, Lieutenant Cavanaugh, before leaving his duty station to
make a phone call." 9 It was arguably reasonable to expect that the marine
would be required to provide an explanation for his request. The defendant
told his superiors that he had received a phone call from his mother
informing him that a North Carolina police detective was headed to
California to arrest him in connection with a murder.' 90 Prior to this
revelation, Davis's leadership did not know that Davis was suspected of a
crime.' 9 '
As articulated by Judge Bryant, under these facts, and
188. State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (Bryant, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 292-93.
190. Id. at 293.
191.

Id.
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considering the factors used in determining whether a servicemember is in
custody-specifically whether he was summoned for interrogation-a
reasonable servicemember in Davis's position would
not have believed
192
himself to be under formal arrest or its equivalent.
As the above discussion illustrates, the rule in Davis is at once too
narrow, too broad, and unnecessarily complex. It is too narrow because it
fails to extend Miranda's protections to servicemembers who make
incriminating statements to superiors who are not commissioned officers.
This failure creates a loophole that may allow statements otherwise
inadmissible in a military tribunal to be used against a military defendant in
a civilian court of law. It is too broad because the court's substantial
reliance on a military superior's authority to determine whether a defendant
was in custody under Miranda effectively expands custody to encompass
all interactions between commissioned officers and their inferiors. It is
unnecessarily complex in that is requires the court to decipher military
culture, rank, and authority in order to apply its strictures.
B.

The ConcurringApproach: A Guidepost to a Better Rule

In her concurring opinion, Judge Bryant highlighted the incongruity
between the majority's command that the military context be considered
and its application of civilian law.' 93 She further stressed that the majority
opinion will have the effect of "creating what amounts to a limited 'soldiercommanding officer' privilege, whereby no statement given by a member
of the armed forces to a commanding officer would be admissible in a
civilian court absent Miranda warnings.' 94 Bryant urged, "The better rule
is that a superior officer need only give the appropriate warnings to
someone under his command that he suspects has committed an offense
and when the questioning is for [law enforcement or] disciplinary
purposes .... "195
While the rule advanced by Judge Bryant-which is presently applied
by military tribunals under Article 31(b) of the UCMj 96-only addresses
the overly broad aspect of Davis, it hints at the remedy for Davis's other
flaws. As noted above, Article 31(b) is a statutory provision crafted
specifically to protect servicemembers against compulsory self-

192. Id. at 299-300 (Bryant, J., concurring).

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. (Bryant, J., concurring).
Id. at 299 (Bryant, J., concurring).
Id. (Bryant, J., concurring).
10U.S.C. § 831(b) (2012).
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incrimination ina military setting. 197 Thus, from its inception, the statutory
rule has incorporated the military context, thereby eliminating the need for
civilian courts to tailor tests established by Miranda and its progeny to
situations in which servicemembers were questioned by their military
superiors. The Military Rules of Evidence require that any person subject
to the Code who is required to give Article 31 warnings first inform a
would-be interrogee of the basis of the accusation against him.' 98 Further,
such a person must also inform the "accused or suspect" of his right to
remain silent and that any statement may be used against him in court.' 99
Under a test based upon the provisions of Article 31, the Davis court
wouldn't have needed to inquire into the specific authority of Chief
Warrant Officer Brown because Brown, as a military officer, was subject to
the UCMJ. 200 The UCMJ requires any person subject to the Code to
provide its warnings before questioning a person suspected of a criminal
offense.20 ' Whether a person is subject to the Code is a good deal more
easily ascertainable than the specific authority possessed by a superior
under the UCMJ. Likewise, since Article 31 applies to all members of the
military, a test based upon its provisions would not exclude military
20 2
superiors who are not "commissioned officers" as does the Davis test.
Furthermore, the military courts presume at least a disciplinary purpose
when a military superior questions a defendant. 2 3 Thus, the need for
determining whether a person's authority renders his position tantamount to
a civilian law enforcement official can be eliminated through the
application of the test described below.
The Court of Military Appeals has recognized that Article 31 and
Miranda rights are distinct in their origins and that both serve to protect
servicemembers. °4 As noted by the Evans court, Article 31 warnings are
statute-based and occur at a lower threshold than do their Miranda
counterparts. 05
In identifying two distinct categories of Article 31

197. United States v. Brown, 38 M.J. 696, 698 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993); see Major Howard 0.
McGillin, Jr., Article 31(b) Triggers: Re-examining the "Officiality Doctrine," 150 MIL. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1995) (explaining that Congress's motivation in creating Article 31(b) was to
"eliminate the unique pressures of military rank and authority from military justice.").

198. MIL. R. EVID. § 305(c).
199. Id. §§ 305(c)(2)-(3).
200. 10 U.S.C. § 831.
201. Id.
202. State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
203. United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 446 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Good, 32 M.J. 105, 108 (C.M.A. 1991)).
204. United States v.Evans, 75 M.J. 302, 304-05 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
205. Id. at 303.
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violations-"(a) purely statutory [and] (b) statutory ... that also present a
constitutional violation" 20 6-that court also offers civilian criminal courts a
roadmap to applying constitutional analysis where servicemembers have
made incriminating statements to military superiors, military police, or
agents of military police. As the Evans court explained, Article 31
warnings must be given whenever a person subject to the Code questions or
interrogates a person accused or suspected of an offense.20 Article 31
offenses rise to the level of Miranda when the statutory requirement for
warnings has been met and the interrogee is in custody at the time of the
questioning. 2°' To determine whether a suspect was in custody at the time
of questioning, military courts consider: "(1) whether the person appeared
for questioning voluntarily; (2) the location and atmosphere of the place20 in
9
which the questioning occurred[;] and (3) the length of the questioning.,
Evans offers North Carolina two approaches for revising its current
rule under Davis. First, it could adopt Evans in full, thus requiring the
exclusion of any statement that would otherwise be excludable in a military
court-whether under Article 31 or Miranda-Tempia. This approach
would offer a lower threshold for exclusion of inculpatory statements and
would conversely offer servicemembers the greatest level of protection
against the dangers of self-incrimination. Second, the North Carolina
courts could adopt only Evans's Mirandarule. While this approach would
offer less protection than the first, it would fill Davis's loophole by
subjecting all military superiors to Miranda's strictures, rather than just
commissioned officers. The second approach would also simplify North
Carolina's Miranda analysis by substituting the current inquiry into a
military superior's rank and authority with one question: Is he subject to
the UCMJ?
Because the court ultimately declined to overturn Davis's conviction
on a finding of harmless error,210 it is doubtful that even the adoption of the
full Article 31 analysis laid out in Evans would have provided him any
relief. However, the same cannot be said for Blackett and Gamez, who
were left unprotected under North Carolina's current law. Under Evans's
Article 31 analysis, because both Sergeant Sellers and First Sergeant
Schlegelmilch were subject to the UCMJ, the inquiry would have been
simply whether Blackett and Gamez were accused or suspected of an
offense at the time of questioning. Because Blackett's initial confession to
206. Id. at 305.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 305-06.
209. Id. at 306 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Chatfield, 67 M.J. 432,
438 (C.A.A.F. 2009)).
210. State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss1/9

30

Gurwitch: Article 31(B), Tempia-Miranda, and the Military Defendant

2018]

THE MILITARY DEFENDANT

Sergeant Sellers was made spontaneously and not in response to
questioning by Sellers, that statement would be admissible under Evans.
However, Blacken's subsequent statements to First Sergeant Schlegelmilch
would likely be excluded because Sellers had already informed
Schlegelmilch of Blackett's confession by the time of that questioning,
such that she had reason to suspect Blackett of a crime. The same applies
to Gamez because, at the time of his questioning, Blackett had already
implicated him in the shooting; thus, the NCOs had reason to suspect him
of a crime. Under Evans's Miranda analysis, because Sellers and
Schlegelmilch were subject to the UCMJ, the traditional law enforcement
prong of Miranda would be disposed of without significant discussion.
The question of custody would be answered under Evans's second prong
and without regard for the questioner's authority. If the court determined
that Blackett and Gamez were in custody during the various instances of
questioning by their military superiors, then Mirandawould apply.
CONCLUSION

In the majority opinion, penned by Judge Geer, the Davis court
articulated the need to consider the military context.2 1' In the end, by
filtering military factors and considerations through the lens of civilian law,
the court failed to heed its own admonition to consider the military context.
The UCMJ does not control where a servicemember is being tried in a
civilian court of law.212 Consequently, North Carolina courts have no
obligation to apply its exclusionary rule. That said, the superior knowledge
and wisdom of the military courts with regard to military matters cannot be
denied.21 3 Congress, in recognition of the pressures and coercive impact of
questioning by a military superior, saw fit to pass legislation that extended
greater protections to servicemembers than the Supreme Court extended to
civilians in Miranda. North Carolina courts should take notice.
Allowing military superiors to question their charges in violation of
Article 3 1, knowing that such a violation would prevent admission of such
statements in a military tribunal but be admissible in civilian court so long
as they did not rise to the level of a Miranda violation, would represent a
great injustice to the American soldier. Because the UCMJ and military
jurisprudence provide civil courts the tools with which to efficiently and
fairly gauge the coercive impact of questioning of a defendant by a military
superior and to determine whether a defendant's constitutional rights have
211. See State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 293-95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
212. See 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012); United States v. Santiago, 966 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
213. See generally United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1978).
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been harmed, civil courts should look to their opposite numbers in the
military for guidance. By incorporating Evans's teachings into its Miranda
jurisprudence, North Carolina could simultaneously correct the loophole
left in Davis and simplify its current Miranda analysis as applied to
servicemembers who make statements to military superiors. In this way,
the military's interests in maintaining order and discipline remain
undisturbed, while the servicemember's constitutional rights are protected.
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